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Abstract: The anti-reductionist character of the recent 
philosophy of biology and the dynamic development of the 
science of emergent properties prove that the time is ripe 
to reintroduce the thought of Aristotle, the first advocate 
of a “top-down” approach in life-sciences, back into the 
science/philosophy debate. His philosophy of nature 
provides profound insights particularly in the context of the 
contemporary science of evolution, which is still struggling 
with the questions of form (species), teleology, and the role of 
chance in evolutionary processes. However, although Aristotle 
is referenced in the evolutionary debate, a thorough analysis 
of his theory of hylomorphism and the classical principle of 
causality which he proposes is still needed in this exchange. 
Such is the main concern of the first part of the present 
article which shows Aristotle’s metaphysics of substance 
as an open system, ready to incorporate new hypothesis of 
modern and contemporary science. The second part begins 
with the historical exploration of the trajectory from Darwin 
to Darwinism regarded as a metaphysical position. This 
exploration leads to an inquiry into the central topics of the 
present debate in the philosophy of evolutionary biology. It 
shows that Aristotle’s understanding of species, teleology, and 
chance – in the context of his fourfold notion of causality – 
has a considerable explanatory power which may enhance our 
understanding of the nature of evolutionary processes. This 
fact may inspire, in turn, a retrieval of the classical theology 
of divine action, based on Aristotelian metaphysics, in the 
science/theology dialogue. The aim of the present article is to 
prepare a philosophical ground for such project. 
Keywords: Aristotle; Darwin; evolution; natural selection; 
hylomorphism; principle of causation; teleology; chance; 
essentialism 
Motto: Everything is mechanical in a machine, except 
the idea to construct it, which has dictated the plan of 
it. One hardly dares to touch the luminous, translucent 
page wherein Creative Evolution develops perfectly 
self-assured views, nourished by truths of every sort, 
and nevertheless dominated by a kind of metaphysical 
Manicheanism in which intelligence, dragging finality 
with it, is condemned to dwell in the house of geometry 
and evil. (Étienne Gilson, From Aristotle to Darwin and 
Back Again) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Any attempt at a reliable dialogue between theology 
and science requires from us, at first, a careful analysis of 
the philosophical aspects concerning scientific theories, 
as well as the philosophical presuppositions and language 
grounding theological reflection. Thus, philosophy of 
science, philosophy of nature, and metaphysics become a 
bridge between science and theology, protecting both sides 
from misunderstanding and confusion. The aim of this 
article is to bring the contemporary philosophy of biological 
evolution and Aristotle’s theory of hylomorphism, teleology 
and chance, into a conversation, which may further serve as 
a background for a theological reflection on divine action in 
evolution, rooted in Aristotelian/Thomistic tradition. 
One of the major advances of the contemporary 
philosophy of biology is its criticism of the predominant 
reductionist dogma and the “bottom-up” approach in life-
sciences. In the context of this methodological change, 
Aristotle – the first and one of the greatest philosophers of 
biology – reenters science/philosophy debate, presenting a 
position which cannot be neglected. While the predecessors 
of his philosophical reflection on nature found it necessary to 
specify the most basic and enduring entities, and define the 
principles of the compositional explanation of everything 
else, Aristotle opted for a “top-down” approach in life-
sciences. As the first anti-reductionist, he argued that natural 
objects owe their characteristic modes of being and acting 
to their formal natures. Aristotle’s way of doing biology 
reflected the basic principles of his substance metaphysics, 
founded on the concepts of hylomorphism (material 
and formal composition of entities), teleology, essence, 
chance and necessity, and thus remained in opposition to 
materialistic and reductionist explanations found among 
Pre-Socratics. 
Although some of the affinities between Aristotle’s 
biology and the contemporary anti-reductionism of the science 
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of emergent properties seem to be apparent and undeniable 
for certain participants of the science/philosophy debate,1  
other scientists and philosophers do not hesitate to notice 
and emphasize deep and far-reaching differences between 
these two traditions. Aristotle is accused of presenting 
too static an explanation of nature. His metaphysics of 
substances is opposed to the process understanding of the 
most basic levels of the fabric of the cosmos. His definition 
of species as fixed and enduring essences seems to remain 
in radical opposition to evolutionary theory, and his concept 
of teleology (final causation) appears to many as based on 
an unacceptable idea of backward causality of future goals 
on the present state of affairs.2 
Nevertheless, I believe that many of these difficulties 
can be resolved as the basic assumptions of the Aristotle’s 
philosophical system prove flexible enough to respond 
to current issues debated in science and philosophy of 
science. I claim that we find a particular example of this 
actuality of Aristotle’s natural philosophy in the context 
of the contemporary science of evolution, which returns 
to the questions of understanding of forms (species), 
teleology, and the role of chance in evolutionary processes. 
Moreover, I think that the Aristotelian tradition successfully 
refutes the metaphysical claims of naïve mechanicism, and 
reductionism, presented in the past by some radical Neo-
Darwinists. 
In the first part of this article I will discuss metaphysical 
aspects of the theory of evolution in its encounter with 
hylomorphism and the classical principle of causation 
which says that higher effects cannot have lower causes. 
This consideration will serve as a necessary background 
for the second section. This second section will first begin 
with a historical inquiry exploring the transition from 
Darwin to Darwinism as a metaphysical position. Next, I 
will concentrate on philosophical aspects of species, natural 
selection, teleology, and chance in the theory of evolution. I 
will try to show that the Aristotelian philosophical tradition 
remains relevant with regard to some issues discussed 
recently among philosophers of biology. 
Metaphysics of Evolution 
If there exists a metaphysical foundation for the theory 
of evolution one would not expect to find it in the substance 
metaphysics of Aristotle and his followers. Juxtaposing 
1 See for instance Philip Clayton, “Conceptual Foundations of Emergence 
Theory,” in The Re-Emergence of Emergence, edited by Philip Clayton, 
and Paul Davies (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
4-5; Terrence Deacon, Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from 
Matter (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011), 34-7, 230-  
4; Claus Emmeche, Simo Køppe, and Frederic Stjernfeld, “Levels, 
Emergence, and Three Versions of Downward Causation,” in Downward 
Causation. Mind, Bodies and Matter, edited by Peter Bøgh Andersen, 
Claus Emmeche, Niels O. Finnemann, and Peder Voetmann Christiansen 
(Aarhus, Oxford: Aarhus University Press, 2000), 13-34; Alvaro 
Moreno, and Jon Umerez, “Downward Causation at the Core of Living 
Organization,” in Downward Causation. Mind, Bodies and Matter, 
edited by Peter Bøgh Andersen, Claus Emmeche, Niels O. Finnemann, 
and Peder Voetmann Christiansen (Aarhus, Oxford: Aarhus University 
Press, 2000), 99-116. 
2 See for instance Mark H. Bickhard and Donald T. Campbell, Emergence, 
http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/emergence.html (accessed 26 September, 
2014); Menno Hulswit, “How Causal is Downward Causation?,” Journal 
for General Philosophy of Science vol. 36, no. 2, p. 276, 2005. 
Aristotle with Darwin seems like an oxymoron in the 
context of the general opinion that the latter ultimately 
proved the inadequacy of the biology of the former. A 
radical discrepancy between the evolution of species and 
a metaphysics of substances that excludes any notion of 
change or transformation of species seems evident and 
undeniable. However, although Aristotle seems to explicitly 
reject evolution, a careful study of his thought shows that 
he was concerned with the dynamics of change in nature, 
and that the basic categories of his metaphysics, such as 
hylomorphism, principles of causation, account of chance, 
and even the problem of species, do not rule out the concept 
of evolution. Quite the opposite, Aristotle’s metaphysics 
proves to be an open system, ready to incorporate new 
hypothesis of modern and contemporary science. I will now 
discuss to a greater extent a possible response of Aristotle to 
the theory of evolution. 
A. The Concept of Hylomorphism and Evolution 
In order to understand better the process of generation, 
change, corruption, and decay, and give a proper description 
of both changing and persistent aspects of nature, Aristotle 
introduces the categories of mater and form. The first one 
refers not only to the stuff out of which things are made.3  
The idea of ‘primary matter’ (pratē hulē) is the principle 
of potentiality, something that persists through all changes 
that a given substance can be exposed to, something that 
constitutes the very possibility of being a substance at all: 
The matter comes to be and ceases to be in one sense, 
while in another it does not. As that which contains the 
privation, it ceases to be in its own nature, for what 
ceases to be – the privation – is contained within it. But 
as potentiality it does not cease to be in its own nature, but 
is necessarily outside the sphere of becoming and ceasing 
to be. (...) For my definition of matter is just this – the 
primary substratum of each thing, from which it comes to 
be without qualification, and which persists in the result.4 
Form, on the other hand, is not only an organizing 
principle arranging the geometrical structure and shape 
of the constituent parts of an entity (substance).5  It is an 
3 “[T]hat out of which a thing comes to be and which persists, is called 
‘cause’, e.g. the bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl, and the 
genera of which the bronze and the silver are species” (Aristotle, Physics 
in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon [New York: 
The Modern Library, 2001], II, 3 [194b 24-25], from now on Phys.). See 
also Aristotle, Metaphysics, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by 
Richard McKeon (New York: The Modern Library, 2001), V, 2 (1013a 
24-25), from now on Meta. 
4 Aristotle, Phys. I, 9 (192a 25-33). See also Phys. I, 7 (191a 8-12); II, 7 
(198a 21-22); Meta. VII, 3 (1029a 20-21); VIII, 4 (1044a 15-23); IX, 7 
(1049a 19-22, 24). 
5 “’Cause’ means (...) (2) The form or pattern, i.e. the definition of 
the essence, and the classes which include this (e.g. the ratio 2:1 and 
number in general are causes of the octave), and the parts included in 
the definition” (Aristotle, Meta. V, 2 [1013a 27-28]). See also Phys. II, 3 
(194b 26-27). In both definitions of formal causation Aristotle uses the 
term “ὁ λόγος τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι,” which Gaye translates as “the statement 
of the essence,” and Ross as “the definition of the essence.” However, 
Aristotle uses also two other terms: µορgpή and εἴδος which translate as 
“shape” or “appearance.” These may bring a confusion and a reduction 
of form to a geometrical shape, which flattens out Aristotle’s original 
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informing principle of actuality, that, by which a thing is 
what it is; an intrinsic, determining principle that actualizes 
primary matter and thus constitutes an individual being. 
The meaning of form is easier to grasp in the context of 
Aristotle’s account of accidental and substantial change: 
[T]here is ‘alteration’ when the substratum is perceptible 
and persists, but changes in its own properties, the 
properties in question being opposed to one another 
either as contraries or as intermediates. The body, e.g. 
although persisting as the same body, is now healthy and 
now ill; and the bronze is now spherical and at another 
time angular, and yet remains the same bronze. But when 
nothing perceptible persists in its identity as a substratum, 
and the thing changes as a whole (when e.g. the seed as 
a whole is converted into blood, or water into air, or air 
as a whole into water), such an occurrence is no longer 
‘alteration’. It is a coming-to-be of one substance and 
a passing-away of the other-especially if the change 
proceeds from an imperceptible something to something 
perceptible (either to touch or to all the senses). 6 
The form of an entity body is therefore more than 
just a shape. As an intrinsic and constitutive principle of 
the essence of its being, substantial form persists through 
accidental changes. However, Aristotle notes that a thing 
can change as a whole in a way which brings not only an 
alteration of an existent being, but the coming-to-be of a 
new substance. 
Matter and form are intrinsically related for Aristotle. 
They cannot exist separately. In other words, we know form 
only as realized in primary matter, and we know primary 
matter only as in-formed; there is no place for Platonic 
dualism here. Aristotle observes a substantial unity of being 
at first, and introduces a distinction between primary matter 
and substantial form to explain this unity and the fact that 
things can change. In the book VIII of the Metaphysics we 
read: 
What then, is it that makes man one; why is he one and 
not many? (...) [I]f, as we say, one element is matter 
and another is form, and one is potentially and the other 
actually, the question will no longer be thought a difficulty. 
(...) The difficulty disappears, because the one is matter, 
the other form. (...) [T]he proximate matter and the form 
are one and the same thing, the one potentially, and the 
other actually. (...) Therefore there is no other cause here 
unless there is something which caused the movement 
from potency into actuality.7 
idea. Aristotle uses one more term: ἐντελέχεια, which relates formal 
to final causation and denotes form as actualized in the final state of a 
being. 
6 	 Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals, in The Basic Works of 
Aristotle, vol. 5, edited by J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1912), I, 4 (319b 10-18), from now on On Gen. See also Aristotle 
On Generation and Corruption, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by 
Richard McKeon (New York: The Modern Library, 2001), I, 4 (319b 10-  
18). 
7 	 Aristotle, Meta. VIII, 4 (1045a 14, 21-25, 29-30; 1045b 18-  
19, 21-2). We find a similar argumentation in On the Soul: “That is why 
we can wholly dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the soul and 
This hylomorphic doctrine of Aristotle’s metaphysics 
proves to be of special importance for the theory of evolution. 
Both matter and form, refer to the principles of persistence 
and change. Aristotle claims, “The matter comes to be and 
ceases to be in one sense, while in another it does not.” By 
saying this, he emphasizes that, when in-formed, primary 
matter as the subject of the privation of form, somehow 
“ceases to be.” But on the other hand, its potentiality is 
never lost. Because of this, primary matter is “outside the 
sphere of becoming and ceasing to be”, and “persists in the 
result.”8  When speaking about form, Aristotle argues that 
although the substantial forms of living and non-living 
beings are fixed, nevertheless, substances may be altered 
with respect to their accidental forms (e.g. green apple 
changing its color from green to red when ripe). What is 
more, when the primary matter of an already existing being 
is properly disposed, it may receive a new substantial form 
in a process of the coming-to-be of a new substance, that is 
‘generation’ or ‘corruption.’9 
The idea of the disposition of matter is related to a natural 
tendency of matter to be in-formed by more perfect forms. 
Aristotle recognizes an ascent of perfection of the beings 
in nature. On his scala naturae we can observe a gradual 
crescendo from non-living, through plant and animal, to 
human forms: 
Nature proceeds little by little from things lifeless to 
animal life in such a way that it is impossible to determine 
the exact line of demarcation, nor on which side thereof an 
intermediate form should lie.10 
the body are one: it is as meaningless as to ask whether the wax and the 
shape given to it by the stamp are one, or generally the matter of a thing 
and that of which it is the matter. Unity has many senses (as many as ‘is’ 
has), but the most proper and fundamental sense of both is the relation of 
an actuality to that of which it is the actuality” (Aristotle, On the Soul, in 
The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon [New York: The 
Modern Library, 2001], II, 1 [412a 6-9]). See also Aristotle, On the Parts 
of Animals, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, vol. 5, edited by J. A. Smith 
and W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1912), I, 1 (640b 22-29), from 
now on Part. An. 
8 	 Aristotle, Phys. I, 9 (192a 25-33). 
9 	 The need for proportion between form and matter (act and 
potency) is emphasized by Aristotle in Meta. VIII, 4 (1044a 15-23), and 
even more explicitly by Aquinas in his Commentary on Metaphysics: 
“From the things which are said here then it is evident that there is one 
first matter for all generable and corruptible things, but different proper 
matters for different things” (Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on The 
Metaphysics of Aristotle. 2 Vols. Translated by John Rowan [Chicago: 
Regnery Press, 1961], VIII, lect. 4 [§1730], from now on In meta.). In 
Summa contra gentiles he adds: “Thus, form and matter must always 
be mutually proportioned and, as it were, naturally adapted, because the 
proper act is produced in its proper matter. That is why matter and form 
must always agree with one another in respect to multiplicity and unity” 
(Thomas Aquinas, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith: Summa Contra 
Gentiles. 4 Vols., translated by Anton C. Pegis et al. [Garden City, New 
York: Image Books, 1955-1957], II, 81, no. 7, from now on SCG). 
10 	 Aristotle, The History of Animals, in The Basic Works of 
Aristotle, vol. 4, edited by J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1910), VIII, 1 (588b 4-6), from now on Hist. An. Aristotle gives 
at this point an example of the ascent of nature from plants to animals: 
“[T]here is observed in plants a continuous scale of ascent towards the 
animal. So, in the sea, there are certain objects concerning which one 
would be at a loss to determine whether they be animal or vegetable” 
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[N]ature passes from lifeless objects to animals in such 
unbroken sequence, interposing between them beings 
which live and yet are not animals, that scarcely any 
difference seems to exist between two neighbouring 
groups owing to their close proximity.11 
There is a good deal of overlapping between the various 
classes.12 
Similar is the position of Aquinas, one of the most 
prominent commentators of Aristotle, who also notices a 
tendency of nature towards superior forms in the process of 
generation and corruption. In his Summa contra gentiles we 
find an important reflection on the hierarchy of degrees in 
substantial transformation, which I should quote extensively: 
[T]he more posterior and more perfect an act is, the more 
fundamentally is the inclination of matter directed toward 
it. Hence in regard to the last and most perfect act that 
matter can attain, the inclination of matter whereby it 
desires form must be inclined as toward the ultimate end 
of generation. Now, among the acts pertaining to forms, 
certain gradations are found. Thus, primary matter is in 
potency, first of all, to the form of an element. When it is 
existing under the form of an element it is in potency to 
the form of a mixed body; that is why the elements are 
matter for the mixed body. Considered under the form of 
a mixed body, it is in potency to a vegetative soul, for this 
sort of soul is the act of a body. In turn, the vegetative 
soul is in potency to a sensitive soul, and a sensitive one 
to an intellectual one. (...) So, elements exist for the sake 
of mixed bodies; these latter exist for the sake of living 
bodies, among which plants exist for animals, and animals 
for men. Therefore, man is the end of the whole order of 
generation.13 
Our reflection on hylomorphism, substantial and 
accidental change, the disposition of matter and its tendency 
(Hist. An. 588b 11-13). With the advance of modern science we find it 
easier to define taxon-specific characteristics. 
11 	 Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, in The Basic Works of 
Aristotle, vol. 5, edited by J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1912), IV, 5 (681a 12-15), from now on Par. An. Aristotle gives 
an example of the sponge which here he classifies as a plant: “A sponge, 
then, as already said, in these respects completely resembles a plant, 
that throughout its life it is attached to a rock, and that when separated 
from this it dies” (Par. An. 681a 15-17), whereas in History of Animals 
he compares it to animals, due to its sensation: “Stationary animals are 
found in water, but no such creature is found on dry land. In the water are 
many creatures that live in close adhesion to an external object, as is the 
case with several kinds of oyster. And, by the way, the sponge appears to 
be endowed with a certain sensibility” (Hist. An. I, 1 [487b 9-10]). 
12 	 Aristotle, Gen. An. II, 1 (732b 15). See also Fran O’Rourke, 
“Aristotle and the Metaphysics of Evolution,” The Review of Metaphysics 
no. 58, pp. 39-40, Sept., 2004. He claims that “Without exaggerating its 
importance, Aristotle recognizes man’s link to the primates: the ape, the 
monkey, and the baboon, he states, dualize in their nature with man and 
the quadrupeds” (Hist. An. II, 8 [502a 16-18], transl. A. L. Peck). In 
Par. An. IV, 10 (689b 31-33) Aristotle adds that: “The ape is, in form, 
intermediate between man and quadruped, and belongs to neither, or to 
both.” 
13 	 SCG, III, 22, 7. See also Antonio Moreno, “Some Philosophical 
Considerations on Biological Evolution,” The Thomist no. 37, pp. 440-  
41, July, 1973. 
to be in-formed by more perfect forms, helps us to think 
about metaphysical aspects of the mechanism of evolution. 
Evolution can be understood, according to Moreno and 
O’Rourke, as a series of accidental changes in the structure 
of genetic material (DNA), effecting the disposition of 
primary matter, and leading to a precise instant at which the 
primary matter of the egg and sperm, when joined, is not 
disposed to the old substantial form (F1) of the parents, but 
to a new substantial form (F2), constituting a new species. It 
takes many mutations (outcomes of which are regulated by 
natural selection) to produce such an effect, and its actual 
occurrence may be extremely difficult to capture. But this 
does not exclude the possibility of its occurring, especially 
in a situation where members of a species migrate to a new 
environment and can be modified gradually in subsequent 
generations, to the point where they cannot mate with the 
descendants of their ancestors any more. Thus it becomes 
clear that, even if Aristotle’s biological research was far from 
discovering the possibility of the transformation of species, 
his metaphysics left much room for such a possibility.14 
B. Causation Principle and Evolution 
An Aristotelian response to the theory of evolution faces 
another important metaphysical problem. It seems to violate 
the basic philosophical principle of causation, which says 
that the higher cannot come from the lower.15  To deal with 
this difficulty we should first notice a fundamental difference 
between the metaphysical order of various degrees of 
perfection of different ‘essences,’ and the biological order 
of different forms of life which is based on a historical and 
phenomenological analysis. Metaphysical categories of 
‘higher’ and ‘lower’ should not be equated with biological 
concepts describing organisms as ‘more complex’ and 
‘better adapted.’ In other words, ‘more complex’ and ‘better 
adapted’ do not presuppose a higher perfection of ‘essence.’ 
Insects, for instance, are certainly not the highest organisms 
in terms of the metaphysical perfection of their ‘essence,’ 
but they can be regarded as a culmination of an evolutionary 
line in terms of adaptation to their environmental niche. 
That is why, when biology speaks of different species, it 
does not mean to speak of different ‘essences,’ as it is not 
interested in levels of ontological perfection. 
Moreover, the mechanism of biological evolution does 
not coincide with the philosophical notion of efficient 
causality. To ‘descend from,’ or to ‘be produced out of’ 
differs in meaning from the philosophical notion of being 
‘caused’ or ‘produced by.’ In addition, the emphasis on the 
historical aspect of the development of various species helps 
us to see it as a complex result of many causal influences. 
The mechanism of evolution would then seem to involve 
14 	 Moreno, “Some Philosophical Considerations,” 429-31; 
O’Rourke, “Aristotle,” 26-7: “If Aristotle’s metaphysical analysis of 
growth and change is correct, the principles of form and the affirmation 
of potency will hold a fortiori for the evolutionary process” (O’Rourke, 
“Aristotle,” 27). 
15 	 “[T]he begetter is of the same kind as the begotten” (Meta. 
VII, 8 [1033b 30]). “[N]o effect exceeds its cause” (Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica. 5 Vols., translated by the Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province [Scotts Valley, CA: NovAntiqua, 2008], II-II, 32, 
4, obj. 1, from now on ST). “[E]very agent produces its like” (SCG II, 
21, no. 9). “[T]he order of causes necessarily corresponds to the order of 
effects, since effects are commensurate with their causes” (SCG II, 15, 
no. 4). “[E]very agent acts according as it is in act” (SCG II, 6, no. 4). 
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a matrix of various causes. But can this matrix of causes 
or any one of them individually be considered the efficient 
cause of the eventual product of evolution? As Aristotle 
conceives, an efficient cause always acts for a particular 
end. But none of the factors involved in evolution is 
understood as intending its eventual product. That is why 
we may conclude by emphasizing one more time that the 
proportionate cause of the emergence of the new species is 
not a single law or force, but a concurrence of many causal 
influences constitutive for an evolutionary event, or rather a 
history of evolutionary changes.16 
II. PHILOsOPHICAL PROBLEMs OF DARWIN AND DARWINIsM 
The fact that the Aristotelian tradition is ready to 
accommodate the principles of evolution does not mean that 
it will do so uncritically. This tradition’s careful analysis 
allows us to distinguish between evolutionary science and 
the philosophical conclusions drawn from it. It also proves 
to be an important voice in the discussion of species, natural 
selection, teleology, and the role of chance in nature. I will 
refer to all of these problems in what follows. 
A. Darwin Was Not an Evolutionist 
As Étienne Gilson shows in his excellent study From 
Aristotle to Darwin and Back Again, in Charles Darwin’s 
On the Origin of Species the word “evolution” appears only 
once, in the last of the six editions of the book published 
during his lifetime. We can name at least two reasons 
for which Darwin wanted to avoid using this term in his 
synthesis. First of all, it was already in use by a tradition 
which had assigned to it a meaning radically opposite to 
what he himself discovered. St. Augustine, St. Bonaventure, 
and Malebranche, wanting to emphasize that after creation 
nothing has been added to the world, claimed that everything 
originally contained in nature in the form of seminal notions 
(rationes seminales) gradually ‘e-volves,’ ‘un-folds,’ or 
‘en-velops’ in time. The most representative advocate of 
this position in the 18th  century was Charles Bonnet of 
Geneva, who would place his own ideas of preformation 
and evolution in opposition to the doctrine of epigenesis 
(growth by the successive acquisition and formation of new 
parts). It is clear that this definition of evolution remained in 
radical opposition to what Darwin was suggesting in his On 
the Origin of Species.17 
Darwin was also familiar with the work of Herbert 
Spencer, a philosopher who regarded himself as a father of 
the doctrine of evolution, which he defined as “an integration 
of matter and dissipation of motion”. For a biologist such 
as Darwin, assertions of this kind were simply pointless. 
But he must have been familiar with Spencer’s biological 
views supporting Lamarckism, which he radically rejected, 
after he had developed his idea of natural selection. 
Spencer would agree with Lamarck saying that variations 
in the surrounding environment force organisms to modify 
16 	 Benedict Ashley, “Causality and Evolution,” The Thomist no. 
36, p. 215, Apr., 1972; Norbert Luyten, “Philosophical Implications of 
Evolution,” New Scholasticism vol. 25, pp. 300-302, July, 1951; Leo 
J. Elders, “The Philosophical and Religious Background of Charles 
Darwin’s Theory of Evolution,” Doctor Communis vol. 37, p. 56, 1984. 
17 	 Étienne Gilson, From Aristotle to Darwin and Back Again. 
A Journey in Final Causality, Species, and Evolution (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 2009), 59-61. 
themselves. For Darwin the principle of change was natural 
selection. For this reason he did not want to be associated 
with the position of Spencer.18 
The capital truth of Darwin’s position was trifold: 1) 
That species are groups of individuals that vary slightly from 
one another, and have a tendency to increase their number 
over generations in a process which is constrained by a 
struggle for existence, due to limited resources, diseases, 
and predators.19  2) That favorable variations in species are 
preferred in virtue of a general phenomenon which Darwin 
called ‘natural selection.’ 3) That over time this process 
brings changes in descendant populations of an ancestor 
species that differentiate them enough so that they can be 
classified as different species.20  Darwin wanted to stay away 
from the philosophical baggage of the term ‘evolution’ used 
by Spencer. He referred rather to the idea of ‘transmutation 
of species’ or ‘change of species by descent,’ which better 
described his position. Knowing that his theory was in 
opposition to the literal reading of the Bible, he argued 
against a naïve creationism and the notion of miraculous 
divine intervention in the coming-to-be of new species, 
which he thought was incompatible with the scientific 
spirit.21  But other than this, Darwin did not want to engage 
himself in philosophical or theological debates. He was and 
wanted to remain a scientist. However, that history wrote 
its own scenario which made Darwin a herald of the new 
science and philosophy of evolution, is now undeniable. 
Reflecting on this fact Gilson says: 
It is popularly asked who, Lamarck or Darwin, is the first 
inventor of the doctrine of evolution, although neither of 
them may have claimed the paternity of the discovery, 
18 	 In his Autobiography Darwin says: “I am not conscious of 
having profited in my work by Spencer’s writings. His deductive manner 
of treating every subject is wholly opposed to my frame of mind. (...) His 
fundamental generalizations (...) which I daresay may be very valuable 
under a philosophical point of view, are of such a nature that they do not 
seem to me to be of any strictly scientific use” (The Autobiography of 
Charles Darwin, 1809-1882, ed. Nora Barlow [London: Collins, 1958], 
108-9). Spencer, on the other hand, defending his position says that “[J] 
ust as the theory of the Solar System, held up to the time of Newton, 
would have continued outstanding had Newton’s generalization been 
disproved, so, were the theory of natural selection disproved, the theory 
of organic evolution would remain. (...) The theory of natural selection 
is wrongly supposed to be identical with the theory of organic evolution; 
and the theory of organic evolution is wrongly supposed to be identical 
with the theory of evolution et large” (Herbert Spencer, “Lord Salisbury 
on Evolution, Inaugural Address to the British Association, 1894,” in 
The Nineteenth Century [November 1895], 740-1, 757). 
19 	 Darwin adopted the idea of struggle for existence from Rev. 
T. Malthus, who was concerned with social and political issues. Coming 
from a naturalist point of view he claimed that nature necessarily 
eliminates most of what she produces, due to the limited resources 
sustaining populations. He applied this rule to human population as well 
suggesting that the Poor Law should be abolished because it perpetuates 
and multiplies the ill-adapted. Darwin used political and economic views 
of Malthus in his biological explanation of nature. See Gilson, From 
Aristotle, 88-95. 
20 	 James G. Lennox, “Darwinism and Neo-Darwinism,” in A 
Companion to the Philosophy of Biology, ed. Sahotra Sarkar and Anya 
Plutynski (Oxford: Blackwell, 2011), 80. 
21 	 Darwin’s view of philosophical theology and his image of 
God were rather superficial, which triggered criticism of his work in 
theological circles. 
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while no one would dream of attributing it to Spencer, 
who claims it with good reason. This new unicorn, 
evolutionismus darwinianus, gives proof of a remarkable 
vitality. It owes this, no doubt, to its peculiar nature as 
a hybrid of a philosophic doctrine and a scientific law. 
Having the generality of the one and the demonstrative 
certitude of the other, it is virtually indestructible.22 
Despite Spencer’s protests, the doctrine of evolution 
was attributed to Darwin, who had changed his mind 
noticeably with the publication of the Descent of Man, in 
which he spoke of evolution as a ‘great principle.’ This must 
have been a surprise for those who knew that thirteen years 
before he had written the Origin without even mentioning 
such a term. Nevertheless, Darwin was already regarded as 
an apostle of evolution. Moreover, the term itself, which 
had had philosophical roots and connotations in Spencer, 
remained a philosophical doctrine in Darwin as well. The 
popular understanding of the Neo-Darwinian synthesis, 
which has been developed on the basis of Darwinism, 
laboratory genetics, and the mathematical theory of 
population genetics, is praised by many as a purely scientific 
theory: 
[T]here is a profound truth in the claim that ‘the 
Evolutionary Synthesis’ is, at its core, a brilliant 
integration. Experimental and mathematical genetics are 
wedded to those subjects that dominate On the Origin 
of Species: natural selection acting on chance variation 
as the principal mechanism of evolutionary change; the 
fossil record as the principal historical evidence of the 
evolutionary process; and biogeographic distribution 
providing overwhelming evidence that current populations 
are the products of an evolutionary process.23 
However, this optimism seems to be somewhat 
exaggerated if not unjustified. Experimental and 
mathematical genetics do not answer all the questions 
concerning concrete examples of species and their 
evolutionary traits. The fossil record, although much more 
advanced and complete than in the times of Darwin, still 
has many substantial gaps.24  But most importantly, the 
theory of evolution is by no means purely scientific, which 
is sometimes neglected in scientific circles. In its Neo-
Darwinian version it introduces significant philosophical 
claims and raises many philosophical questions concerning 
species, the nature of selection, the problem of teleology, 
and the nature and role of chance as a factor in evolutionary 
changes. Some of these problems are a subject of an 
intriguing discussion among philosophers of biology. I 
shall now try to introduce the Aristotelian tradition into this 
debate 
22 	 Gilson, From Aristotle, 83. 
23 	 Lennox, Darwinism, 84. 
24 	 It seems that what Darwin says in the Origin is still relevant: 
“Geology assuredly does not reveal any such finely graduated organic 
chain; and this, perhaps, is the most obvious and gravest objection which 
can be urged against my theory. The explanation lies, as I believe, in the 
extreme imperfection of the geological record” (Charles Darwin, On the 
Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of 
Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life [London: John Murray, 1859], 
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_the_Origin_of_Species_(1859)  
[accessed 26 September, 2014], 280). 
B. The Problem of Species 
The fact that the very term ‘evolution’ is not found in 
the book heralded as the foundation of the theory named 
after it, is itself a striking paradox; yet this paradox is 
followed by another. The title of Darwin’s work is, On the 
Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the 
Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. 
However, as Gilson notices, similar to Buffon and Lamarck, 
Darwin actually criticizes the very idea of species, taking a 
nominalist position in the dispute over universals. In the oft-
cited passage from the Origin Darwin states: 
I look at the term species as one arbitrarily given, for 
the sake of convenience, to a set of individuals closely 
resembling each other, (...) [I]t does not essentially differ 
from the term variety, which is given to less distinct 
and more fluctuating forms. The term variety, again, in 
comparison with mere individual differences, is also 
applied arbitrarily, for convenience’s sake.25 
Of course, the question remains of whether Darwin is 
truly denying the objective reality of species. Some say 
that he is merely pointing towards the problem that goes 
back to Aristotle, who, as we have seen, also had difficulties 
distinguishing between non-living and living beings, plants 
and animals, and neighbouring groups of animals, and saw 
“a good deal of overlapping between the various classes.”26 
But I think that it is undeniable that Darwin, even if he does 
not reject the concept of species as such, dissolves it into 
an endless variety of individuals. Even if he cannot help 
using the term ‘species’ from time to time, his transformism 
happens rather on the level of individuals. 
And here comes the problem. If species are only 
constructs of our mind, then evolution also exists merely on 
the level of the abstraction of human reason. But this then 
questions the very credibility of evolution as an empirical 
scientific theory. That is why in the Neo-Darwinian synthesis 
species are making their comeback. Ernst Mayer, one of the 
leading evolutionary biologists of the 20th  century, says that: 
[W]hoever, like Darwin, denies that species are non-
arbitrarily defined units of nature not only evades the issue 
but fails to find and solve the most interesting problems 
of biology.”27 
Without speciation there would be no diversification of 
the organic world, no adaptive radiation, and very little 
evolutionary progress. The species, then, is the keystone 
of evolution.28 
But the debate and search for a precise definition of a 
species based on objective scientific facts has not brought a 
satisfactory solution to the problem yet. At the foundation of 
the Neo-Darwinist approach, both Mayer and Dobzhansky 
were looking for a middle way between essentialism and 
nominalism. Mayer proposed the Biological Species 
Concept (BSC), which was based on the observation of the 
reproductive processes operating at the base of generation 
25 	 Darwin, On the Origin, 52. 
26 	 See above, point I A. 
27 	 Ernst Mayer, Animal Species and Evolution (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1963), 29. 
28 	 Mayr, Animal, 621. 
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and maintenance of species. He defines species in a 
following way: 
Species are groups of actually or potentially interbreeding 
natural populations which are reproductively isolated 
from other such groups. (...) Isolating mechanisms are 
biological properties of individuals which prevent the 
interbreeding of populations that are actually or potentially 
sympatric.29 
This definition emphasizes the relational aspect of 
members of a species which are related to one another 
by causal and historical situations, rather than a shared 
relation to a common type. However, although it seems 
to describe properly epistemological aspect of the 
differentiation of species, I think that Mayer’s definition 
is not quite successful in answering ontological questions. 
Applying the criterion of interbreeding we may conclude 
epistemologically that two populations are different 
species. But the question remains of what makes them to 
be various kinds ontologically? Others criticize Mayer’s 
proposition and the whole variety of other definitions which 
have it as their base, such as recognition, genetic, agamo, 
and ecological species concepts,30  pointing to the difficulty 
in determining the potential for interbreeding in the case of 
groups of organisms that do not overlap or interact due to 
geographic separation? 
The critique of this commonly accepted Neo-Darwinist 
theory of species brought a shift towards more operational 
concepts based on morphological and genetic similarity. We 
classify in this group morphological, phenetic, polythetic, 
genotypic cluster, and genealogical concordance species 
concepts.31  Although they refer mainly to some observable 
traits, regardless of their phylogeny or evolutionary 
relation, their proponents distance themselves from the 
essentialist language of intrinsic properties and substantial 
form. These theories were criticized for various reasons. 
It is difficult to find a common similarity algorithm and 
clustering approach. Some similarities seem to be more 
important than others. Moreover, similarity based concepts 
do not distinguish between polymorphisms in populations 
and differences across genera, between similarities due to 
common ancestry and homologies, and those due to parallel 
evolution. 
Another attempt in defining species emphasized the 
historical dimension of an ancestral-descendent sequence 
of populations evolving separately from the others, and 
having its own tendencies. This historical turn finds its 
expression in the evolutionary species concept (ESC), 
successional, paleospecies, and chronospecies concepts.32 
Because of the problem of drawing borders on the way of the 
transformation of lineages, some evolutionists concentrate 
on phylogenetic branching as a way to demarcate the 
29 	 Ernst Mayer, The Growth of Biological Thought (Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap, 1976), 273-4. 
30 	 For definitions of all these species concepts see Appendix. 
See also Richard A. Richards, “Species and Taxonomy,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Philosophy of Biology, ed. Michael Ruse (Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 177-8. 
31 	 See Appendix; Richards, “Species,” 178-9. 
32 	 See Appendix. ESC identifies species as a “single lineage 
of ancestor-descendent populations which maintains its identity from 
other such lineages and which has its own evolutionary tendencies and 
historical fate” (Richard L. Mayden, “A Hierarchy of Species Concepts: 
The Denouement in the Saga of the Species Problem,” in Species: The 
Units of Biodiversity, ed. M. F. Claridge, H. A. Dawah, and M. R. Wilson 
[London: Chapman and Hall, 1997], 419). 
beginnings and endings of species (cladistics, composite, 
intermodal, and phylogenetic species concepts).33  Others 
opt for the idea of species-as-individuals. Still others want 
to save essentialism by either conceiving species not in 
terms of intrinsic but rather extrinsic, relational properties 
(Grene and Depew), or by defining them as homeostatic 
property cluster kinds with an ability of some of their 
properties to change, which will still save the idea that they 
have essences in a weaker sense (Boy, Griffiths, Wilson).34 
Because this debate seems to multiply definitions of 
species, some thinkers suggest that instead of looking 
for a consensus we should rather accept the plurality 
of species concepts. In its pragmatic version, pluralism 
simply approves the idea of choosing different species 
concepts regarding the interests guiding the classification. 
Ontological pluralism goes further and claims that there 
is no essence to the species concept and that the species 
category is heterogeneous. The consilience position accepts 
pluralism but at the same time remains optimistic about the 
possibility of finding a single, monistic species concept in 
the future. The fourth, hierarchical pluralism distinguishes 
between theoretical and operational species concepts and 
brings the idea of a division-of-labor solution (e.g. the 
ESC serves as a primary, unifying theoretical concept, 
while other concepts have an operational function in the 
identification and individuation of species).35  The whole 
debate regarding the problem of species leaves no doubt 
that contemporary evolutionary biology recognizes and 
acknowledges the need for a definition of species. Various 
attempts to formulate a single, objective definition of species 
based on the data of empirical science, such as reproductive 
processes or morphological and genetic similarities, 
prove that science is tending towards a realist position in 
the dispute over universals. Strict scientific nominalism 
would question evolution, which is in fact observable at 
the level of populations. However, our analysis shows 
that while science tends to provide an adequate account of 
individual organisms, it seems less capable of specifying 
universal traits, traits that are essential to a definition of 
species. Given this difficulty it may be helpful to refer to 
the philosophy of nature. 
Here we find the classical Aristotelian concept of 
species as essences that is presented in his metaphysical and 
biological works. Essentialism is generally associated with 
Plato, Aristotle, and Christian creationism. It is oftentimes 
misunderstood and dismissed for presenting the idea of 
species defined as eternal, immutable, determined by God, 
and discrete.36  Essentialism is also rejected due to the fact that 
its definition of species is based on the idea of internal and 
intrinsic properties of organisms.37  However, what needs to 
33 	 See Appendix. 
34 	 See Richards, “Species,” 179-81. 
35 	 See Richards, “Species,” 181-5. Richards himself believes in 
the possibility of finding “a single, primary concept that colligates facts 
via a set of correspondence rules (not concepts) that serve to bridge the 
theoretical concept to the observable data” (ibid., 185). He finds the ESC 
concept proposed by Mayden as promising as any other. The debate is 
thus still open. On the problem of species see also Marc Ereshefsky, 
“Systematics and Taxonomy,” in A Companion to the Philosophy of 
Biology, ed. Sahotra Sarkar and Anya Plutynski (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2011), 100-4; Marc Ereshefsky, “Species, Taxonomy, and Systematics,” 
in Philosophy of Biology. An Anthology, ed. Alex Rosenberg, and Robert 
Arp (Oxford, Blackwell, 2010), 255-61. 
36 	 See for instance Richards, “Species,” 174-6. 
37 	 I have mentioned above about the attempt to save essentialism 
at the cost of defining it in terms of external and relational, rather than 
intrinsic properties. It shows that the central idea of essentialism is still 
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be emphasized is that the static Platonic concept of species 
conceived as immutable forms, separated from matter and 
existing in the realm of eternal ideas, has little to do with the 
dynamic Aristotelian understanding of species which forges 
a middle path between the absolute realism of Plato and pure 
nominalism. For Aristotle, species are real, immutable and 
eternal in the sense that each one of them involves a form 
which causes a species to be what it is and to exhibit fixed 
and permanent traits. But at the same time, every species 
exists only as realized in concrete, temporal, individual, 
and contingent organisms. Thus the essential intrinsic 
traits of the species are immutable, but not their existential 
realization in nature. Aristotle argues that all representatives 
of a species have a ‘common nature’ (substantial form), 
which finds its expression in the variety of inter-actions and 
inter-relations between unique individuals. In other words, 
species are forms which cannot exist apart from realization 
in concrete substances. In the first part of this article I 
showed that the concept of evolution can be explained as a 
series of existential realizations of forms in nature, carried 
out through the process in which primary matter becomes 
properly disposed to be informed by new substantial forms. 
Species can thus be said to gradually change (evolve) in 
time, but not without a qualification. What needs to be 
clarified is the fact that what actually changes is accidental 
traits and properties of concrete organisms, which brings 
in turn an alteration of the disposition of primary matter, 
preparing it to receive the form of a new species. Therefore, 
strictly speaking, what the complex nexus of evolutionary 
processes brings about, from the Aristotelian point of view, 
is an existential realization of species as forms, educed from 
the potency of primary matter. 
Such an understanding of species puts an emphasis on 
its historical dimension and thus resonates with the ESC. Its 
main advantage is that it brings together both the individual 
and universal traits of an organism. Its philosophical 
character can be easily distinguished from its theological 
implications which renders the concept available to be used 
in the context of contemporary science.38  This is why I am 
of the opinion that Aristotle’s concept of species understood 
as an intrinsic substantial form individually possessed by 
the whole group of organisms (whether the group is defined 
in terms of genotype, phenotype, morphogenetic field) 
should be brought back into discussion as an important 
philosophical principle, complementary rather than 
competitive with scientific views. This opinion is all the 
more reasonable given the growing interest among natural 
scientists in philosophy of nature and philosophical aspects 
of various scientific disciplines, including biology.39 
received with skepticism. 
38 	 See Ashley, “Causality,” 221-6; Elders, “Philosophical,” 50-3; 
Moreno, “Some Philosophical Considerations,” 425-7. 
39 	 I side here with Travis Dumsday, who, accepting the pluralism 
of species concepts, in the conclusion to his article about the scholastic 
ontology of species says: “What I hope to have shown however is that 
an essentialist mode of classification is just as legitimate as any other. 
Of course, from a Scholastic perspective there is a privileged goal in 
taxonomy, namely, definition in accordance with real essence as opposed 
to accidental division by relational or other criteria. If one’s chief concern 
is fundamental ontology, this is clearly the way to go; but biologists are 
not necessarily concerned with fundamental ontology, and we should 
hardly be surprised that alternative modes of classification are employed 
by them.” See Travis Dumsday, “Is There Still Hope For a Scholastic 
Ontology of Biological Species?,” The Thomist vol. 76, p. 394, July, 
C. Natural Selection, Teleology, and Chance 
Among the philosophical aspects of evolution, there are 
other important issues concerning natural selection (NS), 
teleology, and chance. Yet, an attempt to analyze them brings 
about another paradox. In his article on Darwin published 
in 1874, Asa Gray said: “We recognize the great service 
rendered by Darwin to natural science by restoring teleology 
to it, so that instead of having morphology against teleology, 
we shall have henceforth morphology married to teleology.” 
To this Darwin replied saying: “What you say about 
teleology pleases me especially, and I do not think anyone 
else has ever noticed the point.” Similar was the opinion 
of his son Francis, the editor of Darwin’s Autobiography: 
“One of the greatest services rendered by my father to the 
study of Natural History is the revival of Teleology. The 
evolutionist studies the purpose or meaning of organs with 
the zeal of the older Teleologist, but with far wider and 
more coherent purpose.”40  But as I have mentioned above, 
Darwin was first and foremost a scientist, not a philosopher. 
In his correspondence with William Graham, the author of 
The Creed of Science, Darwin acknowledged that he had 
no practice in abstract reasoning. We find a proof for that in 
the same letter to Graham in which he first denies that the 
existence of natural laws implies purpose, but then assures 
him that Graham’s belief that the universe is not the result 
of chance is his inward conviction.41  
This ambiguity makes it difficult to specify the exact 
position of Darwin in the philosophical dispute between 
Descartes, Bacon, and Spinoza, who rejected final causes 
calling them “barren virgins dedicated to God” (Bacon),42 
and Leibniz and Kant, who tried to defend the concept 
of final causality arguing that we must acknowledge that 
organisms are ‘natural purposes.’43  The course taken by 
2012. On a retrieval of essentialism in species concept see also Michael 
Devitt, “Resurrecting Biological Essentialism,” Philosophy of Science 
vol. 75, pp. 344-82, 2008. 
40 	 Asa Gray, “Charles Darwin,” Nature, June 4, 1874; Darwin, 
Autobiography, 308, 316. Huxley's opinion, which Francis Darwin 
used to support his thesis, was the same: “Perhaps the most remarkable 
service to the philosophy of biology rendered by Mr. Darwin is the 
reconciliation of Teleology and Morphology, and the explanation of the 
facts of both, which his views offer” (Thomas Huxley, “Genealogy of 
Animals,” The Academy [1869]). 
41 	 Darwin, Autobiography, 68. 
42 	 Francis Bacon, The Dignity and Advancement of Learning 
(London/New York: The Colonial Press, 1900), 99. In his Letter to 
Mersenne Descartes writes: “The number and the orderly arrangements 
of the nerves, veins, bones, and other parts of an animal do not show 
that nature is insufficient to form them, provided you suppose that in 
everything nature acts in accordance with the laws of mechanics (quoted 
in Denis Walsh, “Teleology,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy 
of Biology, ed. Michael Ruse [Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008], 114). Spinoza in Appendix 1 to his Ethics says this about 
teleology: “That which is really a cause it considers as an effect, and 
vice versa: it makes that which is by nature to be the last, and that which 
is highest and most perfect to be most imperfect” (Benedict Spinoza, 
“Ethics,” in The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza. Vol. 2, tr. R. H. M. 
Elwes [New York: Dover Publications, 1951], 77). 
43 	 Leibniz defends the idea of final and formal cause. The internal 
forces of his monads can be identified with substantial form (according 
to the principle of the identity of indiscernibles). When conceived as 
appetites, they also have a teleological character. However, although in 
his system efficient and final causality are complementary, Leibniz does 
not escape entirely the problem of determinism, which in his philosophy 
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Neo-Darwinism, however, is clear and transparent. The 
line of reasoning that had its foundation in 1869 in Von 
Helmholtz’s praise for Darwin for bringing the study 
of biological form under the ambit mechanism (1869), 
found its culmination a hundred years later in 1969, in the 
position of David Hull who declared: “From the point of 
view of contemporary biology, both vitalism and teleology 
are stone-cold dead.”44  Despite Quine’s philosophical 
objections to this reductionist dogma,45  teleology retained 
its bad reputation in the second half the 20th  century, among 
many philosophers and scientists, who are willing to replace 
with chance. Driven to the extreme, this position led Richard 
Dawkins to formulate his famous metaphysical manifesto in 
which he declares: “The universe we observe has precisely 
the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no 
design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind 
pitiless indifference.”46 
That this position is highly problematic, however, has 
become evident for many. The first signs of the rehabilitation 
of teleology in biology came with the work of three important 
evolutionary biologists: Dobzhansky, Mayr, and Ayala. The 
first one simply notices that “mutation alone, uncontrolled 
by natural selection, would result in the breakdown and 
eventual extinction of life, not in the adaptive or progressive 
evolution.”47  Similar is the position of Francisco Ayala, 
who strives in addition to explain in more detail the nature 
of NS. Defined as differential reproduction, dependent 
on differential survival, mating success, fecundity, and 
survival of offspring, NS is determined by the environment. 
However, Ayala emphasizes that NS is not only a purely 
negative mechanistic end-directed process that promotes 
the useful and gets rid of harmful mutants increasing thus 
reproductive efficiency, but also: 
is able to generate novelty by increasing the probability 
of otherwise extremely improbable genetic combinations. 
Natural selection is creative in a way. It does not 
‘create’ the genetic entities upon which it operates, but 
it produces adaptive genetic combinations which would 
not have existed otherwise. (...) Natural selection is 
teleological in the sense that it produces and maintains 
end-directed organs and processes, when the function or 
end-state served by the organ or process contributes to the 
reproductive fitness of the organisms.48 
takes the form of a pre-established harmony. 
44 	 David Hull, “What Philosophy of Biology Is Not,” Journal of 
the History of Biology vol. 2, p. 249, 1969. 
45 	 Willard van Orman Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” 
in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1953), 20-46. 
46 	 Richard Dawkins, River Out of Eden: A Darwinian View of 
Life (New York: Basic books/Harper Collins, 1995), 132-3. 
47 	 Theodosius Dobzhansky, Genetics of the Evolutionary 
Process (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 65. 
48 	 Francisco J. Ayala, “Teleological Explanations in 
Evolutionary Biology,” in Nature’s Purposes. Analyses of Function and 
Design in Biology, ed. Colin Allen, Marc Bekoff, and George Lauder 
(Cambridge, MA/London: A Bradford Book/The MIT Press, 1998), 35, 
41. Ayala distinguishes between ‘internal’ (natural end-directedness) and 
‘external’ (product of purposeful activity) teleology. He also talks about 
‘determinate’ (end-state reached in spite of environmental fluctuations, 
e.g. physiological or developmental homeostasis), and ‘indeterminate’ 
(end-state as a result of a selection of one from among several 
This attempt to legitimize teleology was criticized 
by Mayr, for whom teleology is equivalent to goal-
directedness and implies a causal activity of a future goal 
on the present situation, which he thinks is not acceptable 
in Neo-Darwinism. For this reason he suggests replacing 
‘teleological’ with ‘teleonomic’ and ‘teleomatic.’ He 
defines the first term as a process or behavior “that owes 
its goal directedness to the operation of a program.” The 
other one refers in his view to “processes that reach an 
end-state caused by natural laws.”49  But this explanation 
is problematic and reveals Mayr’s misunderstanding of 
Aristotle and his definition of teleology. For who is the 
author of a ‘program’ operating towards goal-directedness? 
As Terrence Deacon notices “The major problem with the 
term teleonomy is its implicit agnosticism with respect to 
the nature of the mechanism that exhibits this property.”50 
The question of the source of teleology is simply replaced 
by the one concerning the source of a ‘program.’ Moreover, 
Mayr’s objection about the alleged causal activity of future 
goals with reference to the present is simply an outcome of a 
flattened-out understanding of causality, that he accepts after 
Pittendrigh, who coined the term ‘teleonomy.’ In his letter to 
Mayr, Pittendrigh says: “Teleology in its Aristotelian form 
has, of course, the end as immediate, ‘efficient,’ cause. And 
this is precisely what the biologist (...) cannot accept.”51  
What we find here is an example of a reduction of multiple 
kinds of causality to the efficient cause alone. If an end-
state operated simply as an efficient cause, we would have 
no reason to speak about final causality at all. It seems that 
even Ayala succumbs to this type of reductionism at one 
point, when following Nagel he says that “Teleological 
explanations can be reformulated, without loss of explicit 
content, to take the form of nonteleological ones.”52 
Nonetheless, among some philosophers of biology, 
there is a growing awareness of the limits of this kind of 
reductionism. The budding interest in the classical plural 
account of causality, offered by Aristotle, brings about a 
new understanding of teleology. We find an example of this 
turn in the article by Denis Walsh answering to the three 
alternatives) teleology. See Ayala, “Theological,” 43; Francisco J. Ayala, 
“Teleological Explanations,” in Philosophy of Biology, ed. Michael Ruse 
(New York, MacMillan Publishing Company, 1989), 190. 
49 	 Ernst Mayr, “Teleological and Teleonomic: A New Analysis,” 
in Evolution and the Diversity of Life. Selected Essays (Cambridge, MA/ 
London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1976), 387-90, 
403. Mayr also compares his idea of operational program in nature with 
a computer program: “The purposive action of an individual, insofar as 
it is based on the properties of its genetic code, therefore is no more nor 
less purposive than the actions of a computer that has been programmed 
to respond appropriately to various inputs. It is, if I may say so, a purely 
mechanistic purposiveness.” Again, Mayr seems to forget about the fact 
that the computer program has its conscious designer. His analogy begs 
a question of the source of the properties of the genetic code. Ernst Mayr, 
Toward a New Philosophy of Biology. Observations of an Evolutionist 
(Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press, 1988), 31. 
50 	 Deacon, Incomplete, 121. 
51 	 Mayr, “Teleological,” 392n1. 
52 	 Ayala, “Teleological,” 43. He follows Nagel who claims that 
“teleological explanations are fully compatible with causal accounts. 
(...) Indeed, a teleological explanation can always be transformed into 
a causal one.” By “causal explanation” he means an explanation in 
terms of efficient causes. Ernst Nagel, “Types of Causal Explanation in 
Science,” in Cause and Effect, ed. D. Lerner (New York: Free Press, 
1965), 24-5. See the criticism of Ayala in Walsh, “Teleology,” 123. 
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standard objections concerning teleological explanations: 
1. To the argument of the backward causation of 
nonfactual future states of affairs, he answers that 
it is goal-directedness, as an intrinsic property of a 
system, and not unactualized goals, that explains the 
presence of traits in an organism. 
2. To the argument that all teleological explanation 
require intentionality, he answers that, for Aristotle, 
teleology is present in both non-rational and rational 
nature. Intentionality is not necessary to apply a 
teleological explanation: “It is absurd to suppose that 
purpose is not present because we do not observe the 
agent deliberating.”53 
3. To the argument that all teleological explanation 
appears to have normative import, he answers 
that “Teleology does not require a category of 
value-bearing goal states; it only requires goal- 
directedness.”54 
Walsh recognizes the immanent character of Aristotle’s 
teleology (in opposition to its transcendent Platonic version). 
He finds an irreducible example of this immanence in the 
adaptiveness and phenotypic plasticity of organisms which 
is manifested in their self-organizing goal-directedness 
and capacity to make compensatory changes to form or 
physiology during their lifetime (e.g. acclimatization or 
immune response). On the level of evolutionary changes, 
lineages undergo selection to thus become ever more suited 
to the conditions of their environment. Walsh shows that 
the Darwinian process of iterated mutations and selection 
does not provide a satisfactory explanation for adaptive 
evolution. A careful observer notices that the explanatory 
role of phenotypic plasticity brings back a genuine 
Aristotelian teleology.55  It gives a reason why organisms 
of the one species resemble one another, despite genetic 
variations and environmental influences. It also illuminates 
Aristotle’s idea of hypothetical necessity, by showing that 
alterations to development are hypothetically necessary for 
the continued existence of an organism in its environment.56 
Regarding this approach to teleology, Walsh is by no 
means an isolated thinker. Mark Perlman in his article 
entitled “The Modern Philosophical Resurrection of 
Teleology,” presents a very clear and systematic description 
of the actual views on teleology in evolutionary biology, and 
the philosophy of biology. He distinguishes between non-
naturalistic, quasi-naturalistic, and naturalistic explanations 
of finality in nature. He categorizes both Aristotle’s 
teleological explanation and teleological explanations 
proposed by the science of emergent properties as quasi-
naturalistic. In opposition to these quasi-naturalistic 
theories, he classifies naturalistic theories as those that strive 
53 	 Aristotle, Phys. II, 8 (199b 27). In his Modeling of Nature, 
William Wallace distinguishes three meanings of teleology: terminus 
of an action, perfection of nature of a thing or being, and intention 
of cognitive agents. See, William A. Wallace, The Modeling of 
Nature. Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Nature in Synthesis. 
Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996, 17. 
54 	 Wash, Teleology, 116-21. 
55 	 To find more about Aristotle’s final cause in the context of 
other types of causality see Allan Gotthelf, “Aristotle’s Concept of Final 
Causality,” The Review of Metaphysics vol. 30, pp. 226-54, 1976. 
56 	 Walsh, “Teleology,” 128-32. For Aristotle on hypothetical 
necessity see Part. An., I, 1 (639b 23-6); IV, 2, (677a 15-19); Gen. An., 
IV, 8 (776b 31-3). 
to reduce teleology to a present, past, or future functional 
analysis.57  Thus we can see that both authors acknowledge 
the significance of the rehabilitation of the classical notion 
of teleology in science. As Walsh explains: 
The ‘Aristotelian purge’ was seen as a pivotal achievement 
of early modern science. As a consequence of the scientific 
revolution, the natural sciences learned to live without 
teleology. Current evolutionary biology, I contend, 
demonstrates that quite the opposite lesson needs now to 
be learned. The understanding of how evolution can be 
adaptive requires us to incorporate teleology – issuing 
from the goal-directed, adaptive plasticity of organisms – 
as a legitimate scientific form of explanation. The natural 
sciences must, once again, learn to live with teleology.58 
The question of teleology and the character of NS is 
usually accompanied by the further question concerning the 
role and nature of chance in evolutionary processes. In the 
light of what I have already said about teleology and NS, it 
becomes clear that evolution cannot be attributed to blind 
chance, which is actually a pure absence of explanation. 
What chance tells us is that a referred-to event does not have 
a per se efficient cause. It does not occur for a purpose and 
is inherently unpredictable. But Aristotle reminds us that 
chance, as an accidental cause, occurs always in reference to 
a per se, or proper cause. It does not happen in a void. Quite 
the contrary: it takes place in the world of regularity and 
predictability. Thus although mutations, which are regarded 
as the necessary condition for the possibility of natural 
selection, are truly unpredictable and occur by chance, they 
have an accidental character in reference to the per se cause 
of living beings that strive to survive and produce offspring. 
The acceptance of the plural notion of causality helps us 
understand that the absence of a direct efficient cause of 
mutations does not exclude other kinds of causality from 
being active. Aristotle’s philosophy of nature reminds us to 
take formal and final causality into account in our attempt to 
explain the nature of an evolutionary change.59 
From what I have said in this section we can see that the 
contemporary philosophy of biology finds its way back to 
the Aristotelian philosophy of nature. Scientists have begun 
to slowly acknowledge that the well-established and highly 
effective method of empirical science does not provide 
answers to all relevant questions. Moreover, they have 
begun to understand that an openness towards philosophy of 
nature and metaphysics does not require that they abandon 
their science. Quite the contrary. Philosophical questions 
57 	 Perlman ascribes to Aristotle’s teleology a quasi-naturalistic 
character due to some commentators (e.g. Aquinas, ST, I, 6, 1, ad 2) 
who would say that acting for an end means achieving the ‘good.’ For 
someone who does not acknowledge the existence of natural values, this 
statement may seem to have a normative character. See Mark Perlman, 
“The Modern Philosophical Resurrection of Teleology,” in Philosophy 
of Biology. An Anthology, ed. Alex Rosenberg and Robert Arp (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2010), 149-63. 
58 	 Walsh, “Teleology,” 133. See also an interesting defense of 
teleology which takes on account major skeptical arguments coming 
from science in Robert M. Augros, “Nature Acts for an End,” The 
Thomist vol. 66, pp. 535-75, 2002. 
59 	 See Aristotle, Phys. II, 4-6 (195b 31-198a 13); John Dudley, 
Aristotle’s Concept of Chance. Accidents, Cause, Necessity, and 
Determinism (New York: Sunny Press, 2012), 334-54. 
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not only arise out of empirical observation of the universe, 
but also remain thoroughly grounded in this observation. A 
plain fact of history that serves as a great testament to this 
truth is that so many prominent philosophers throughout 
the ages were also engaged in rigorous observation of the 
natural world. Without doubt, Aristotle and his followers 
are among them. For these reasons, the recent revival of 
Aristotle’s thought, in both the philosophical and scientific 
circles, bears potential to thrust both disciplines unto a new 
horizon of cooperation. 
III. CONCLUsION 
I hope to have proved, through the course of this article, 
that, despite a still present skepticism towards classical 
philosophy, the longstanding legacy of the Aristotelian 
tradition is all the more ready to enter into a fruitful 
conversation with contemporary science and philosophy of 
science. What we find in Aristotle’s natural philosophy and 
metaphysics is a system of thought that is not only coherent 
and consistent, but also flexible and open to the new data 
and current ways of understanding of the universe, its 
structures and processes. 
When introduced to the evolution debate in particular, 
the Aristotelian tradition presents itself, not as an aged 
doctrine that is limited to humble listening and adjusting 
of its principles to the new scientific theories, but, quite 
to the contrary, as an interlocutor that has much to offer. 
In the debate on the concepts of species, natural selection, 
teleology, and the role of chance in evolutionary processes, 
the Aristotelian tradition brings an essential contribution to 
the results achieved by science; a contribution that is highly 
influential, and has a considerable explanatory power which 
must not be neglected. 
I believe that this conversation sets up a stage for a 
fruitful dialogue between science and theological account 
of evolution rooted in Aristotelian/Thomistic tradition. 
IV. AppENDIx: DEFINITIONs OF spECIEs CONCEpTs60 
Agamospecies Concept – A variation of the Genetic 
Species Concept applied for all taxa that are uniparental 
and asexual, represented typically as a collection of clones. 
Examples include many bacteria and some plants and fungi. 
The boundaries of agamospecies are often hard to define. 
Biological Species Concept – Species are groups of 
actually or potentially interbreeding natural populations 
which are reproductively isolated from other such groups. 
(...) Isolating mechanisms are biological properties of 
individuals which prevent the interbreeding of populations 
that are actually or potentially sympatric. 
Cladistic Species Concept – Species are lineages of 
populations between two phylogenetic branch points 
(or speciation events). The cladistic concept recognizes 
species by branch points, despite of how much change 
occurs between them. 
Composite Species Concept – A variation of the Cladistic 
Species Concept. A species is defined, in reference to the 
fossil record, as a segment of a lineage in which a new 
character state becomes fixed. It continues from the point 
where it arises (by cladogenesis) to the point where a new 
60 	 For a more detailed analysis of the definition of species see 
Mayden, “A Hierarchy;” Richards, “Species;” George G. Simpson, 
Principles of Animal Taxonomy (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1961). 
lineage (in which another character state becomes fixed) 
emerges by cladogenesis. 
Ecological Species Concept – Species is a lineage (or 
closely related lineages) which occupies an adaptive zone 
minimally different from that of any other lineages in its 
range. 
Evolutionary Species Concept – Species is a single lineage 
of ancestor-descendent populations which maintains its 
identity from other such lineages and which has its own 
evolutionary tendencies and historical fate. 
Genealogical Concordance Concept – Population 
subdivisions concordantly identified by multiple 
independent genetic traits constitute the population units 
worthy of recognition as phylogenetic taxa. 
Genetic Species Concept – Species is the largest and most 
inclusive reproductive community of sexual and cross-
fertilizing individuals which share a common gene pool. 
Genotypic Cluster Concept – Species are clusters of 
monotypic or polytypic biological entities, identified using 
morphology or genetics, forming groups of individuals that 
have few or no intermediates when in contact. 
Internodal Species Concept – Related to Cladistic 
Species Concept, the notion that a species exists between 
two branching points in a fossil lineage. It is based on a 
fictional presupposition, that a species ceases to exist as 
soon as it branches into two daughter species. 
Morphological Species Concept – Organisms are 
classified in the same species if they appear identical by 
morphological (anatomical) criteia. 
Paleospecies Concept – The term refers to temporally 
successive species in a single lineage. It is also identified 
as Chronospecies, Successional Species, or Allochronic 
Species Concept. 
Phenetic Species Concept – Also known as taximetrics, is 
an attempt to classify organisms based on overall similarity, 
usually in morphology or other observable traits, regardless 
of their phylogeny or evolutionary relation. It is closely 
related to numerical taxonomy which is concerned with the 
use of numerical methods for taxonomic classification. 
Phylogenetic Species Concept – The concept of a species 
as an irreducible group whose members are descended from 
a common ancestor and who all possess a combination of 
certain defining, or derived, traits. Hence, this concept 
defines a species as a group having a shared and unique 
evolutionary history. It is less restrictive than the biological 
species concept, in that breeding between members of 
different species does not pose a problem. Also, it permits 
successive species to be defined even if they have evolved 
in an unbroken line of descent, with continuity of sexual 
fertility. However, because slight differences can be found 
among virtually any group of organisms, the concept tends 
to encourage extreme division of species into ever-smaller 
groups. 
Polythetic Species Concept – A cluster concept that 
defines species in terms of significant statistical covariance 
of characters. 
Recognition Species Concept – The recognition species 
concept is a concept of species, according to which a species 
is a set of organisms that recognize one another as potential 
mates. 
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